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Abstract
The strategic importance of Africa to the United States has grown significantly.
Camp Lemonnier, a naval-led military installation, is located in Djibouti and is vital to
the strategic success of the United States in Africa. In order to strengthen U.S.-Djibouti
ties and solidify an enduring presence in Africa, the Department of Defense implemented
the Djibouti First Initiative. Under the initiative, local vendors received preference for
resources and products needed at Camp Lemonnier. In 2017, the Fiscal Year 2017
National Defense Authorization Act replaced the Djibouti First Initiative with Africa
First.
The new policy extends the authority to limit competition and provide host nation
preference to contracts awarded in support of U.S. operations in Africa. As Africa First
expands its reach, the U.S. must first decipher which African countries can offer suppliers
who are eligible, and second, work to standardize the processes for finding vendors
within each country. The mixed methodology research focuses on the challenges and
successes of the short-lived Djibouti First. The research findings are then used to create a
framework which decision makers can use to help shape future supplier partnerships in
Africa.
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THE AFRICA FIRST INITIATIVE AND LOCAL PROCUREMENT

I. Introduction
Background
Over recent years, the strategic importance of Africa to the United States has
grown significantly. The U.S. military has experienced rising concern over violent
extremist activities and growing interest in the natural resources available in the area.
Prior to the creation of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the continent of
Africa was controlled by three different commands. In 2008, strategic responsibility of
the continent fell under the newest geographic combatant command, AFRICOM. The
command hoped a centralized presence would allow for state building measures,
including more stabilized governments, regional cooperation, and economic
development.
Djibouti, located on the horn of Africa and bordered by Somalia, Ethiopia, and
Eritrea, is one of the poorest countries in the world. However, their strategic position
along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea holds economic promise for the future. Camp
Lemonnier, a naval led military installation, is located in Djibouti and is vital to the
strategic success of the United States in AFRICOM. Camp Lemonnnier (CLDJ) is
manned by approximately 4,000 Department of Defense members and also houses the
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa as a tenant unit. The objectives at CLDJ are
to enable, stage, and support U.S. military operations in the area. Operations on this part
of the continent range from anti-pirating missions, counter-terrorism operations, and
when needed, humanitarian aid and relief efforts.
1

In order to strengthen U.S.-Djibouti ties and solidify an enduring presence in
Africa, DoD contractors have been instructed to give preference to local merchants for
resources and products needed at Camp Lemonnier. The instruction was first known as
the Djibouti First Initiative. Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (FY15
NDAA), section 1263, launched the initiative and sought to “procure products and
services of Djibouti” in support of operations on Camp Lemonnier. Guidance for the
initiative was approved in February 2015 and officially implemented into AFRICOM
policy on June 12 2015. Since this time, millions of dollars’ worth of products and
services have been purchased under the name of Djibouti First. Local procurement of
products and services helps establish relationships and deepen the strategic partnership
between the U.S. and African countries, building their capacity and making them less
dependent on U.S. support by cultivating local resources and capitalizing on local labor
(memo, U.S. Air Force). The galley on Camp Lemonnier purchases items such as fresh
fruits, vegetables, soft drinks, coffee products and baked goods from Coubeche
Distributors, Tom Pouce Bakery and Bunna House Coffee to name a few.
Telecommunications and internet services on Camp Lemonnier are acquired from
Djibouti Telecom and Multivision. Construction service contracts have also been
awarded to locals, for instance, a conference room refurbishment was awarded to
NALCO Construction Co.- a project that included replacement of light fixtures, new
flooring, and interior painting. The Djibouti First initiative has shown promise for the
local community and in 2017 the Department of Defense looked to advance this local
initiative by expanding its reach across the continent. Expanding these authorities to other
regions in Africa can provide legitimate, sustainable business opportunities, promoting
2

stronger U.S.-Host Nation ties in support of Theater Campaign Plan military objectives
(Memo, U.S. Air Force).
The Djibouti First initiative is similar to a previous U.S. policy called the Central
Asian States (CAS) Procurement Initiative, sometimes known as Afghanistan First. In
2010, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 provided preference
to products or services from nine central Asian countries including Afghanistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This policy is part of
the larger counter insurgency effort to help Afghans rebuild their country by providing
legitimate, sustainable business opportunities to Afghan companies and jobs for Afghan
citizens (Rhyne, 2011). The policy was twofold, procuring locally would lessen the
complexity and risk of importing needed products and services while also bolstering
economic development in the area. In addition to finding needed products for military
operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom, the policy looked to keep money in
Afghanistan, ramp up domestic production, place greater emphasis on quality and pride
in domestic production, as well as teaching businesses to compete in commercial and
international markets (Rhyne, 2011). Several success stories have emerged from the CAS
initiative; with the help of the policy local companies were able to improve business by
working to create quality products and more efficient practices. Africa first hopes to
mimic some of this success in Djibouti and throughout the continent in years to come.
On September 15 2017 section 899A of FY17 NDAA replaced the Djibouti First
Initiative as Africa First. The policy extends the authority to limit competition and
provide host nation preference to contracts awarded in support of U.S. operations in
Africa. At the time of this writing, Djibouti is the only country with an enduring U.S.
3

presence. Therefore, Djibouti stands as the lone African nation with processes and
procedures to satisfy the DoD guidelines of procuring local products and services to
assist U.S. operations. The short-lived Djibouti First initiative was very specific, applying
to only U.S. operations at Camp Lemonnier. The initiation of Africa First presents a
number of challenges. With 54 sovereign nations, Africa boasts expansive landscapes,
cultural differences, and geopolitical conflicts. All of these aspects place unique
challenges upon military networks working to procure and distribute supplies for
operational and sustainment missions.
To continue the success of Djibouti First through the newly branded Africa First,
the U.S. must first decipher which countries can offer suppliers who are eligible, and
second, work to standardize the processes for finding vendors in each country. In addition
to finding suitable vendors, the U.S. must ensure the products and services being
purchased satisfy the needs and standards of U.S. operational and strategic missions.
Suppliers awarded contracts through Africa First should be economical, fulfill mission
needs, and contribute to an efficient supply chain.
Problem Statement
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is a critical node of transport and resources for
several U.S. commands, including USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and USTRANSCOM.
DoD contractors are authorized to give price preference to local Djibouti businesses, in
an effort to strengthen the weak local economy and improve U.S.-Djibouti ties. With the
initiation of Africa First, USAFRICOM needs to better understand the supply chain and
financial impacts of the Djibouti First initiative. Supplier partnerships are crucial to an
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effective acquisitions process and by extension, a successful supply chain. Suppliers who
reliably provide quality products or services eliminate the needs of rework, greatly
reducing the need for timely product or service corrections. By purchasing locally,
leaders need to discern whether or not locally procured products are an effective way to
further U.S. strategic interests throughout Africa. Challenges and successes of Djibouti
First should be closely examined in order to create a framework from which a sound
basis of policy for Africa First can be established.
Research Objectives &Questions
The questions this research seeks to answer are: How does purchasing locally
procured products contribute to the supply network at Camp Lemonnier? Furthermore,
how can AFRICOM use this information to better inform their logistical decisions
through Africa First? In order to answer the overarching research question, subsequent
investigative questions will focus on quality, cost and measurement of locally procured
products and services.
1. How will the successes and failures of Djibouti First help shape the
framework and partnerships for Africa First?
2. Have suppliers or their products hindered U.S. operations in any way?
3. Diplomatic ties are often strengthened through diplomatic partnerships,
how does purchasing locally create more advantages as opposed to
outsourcing? What challenges does purchasing locally present to
Djiboutians and the U.S.?
4. Does the initiative provide a cost-effective option for AFRICOM?
5. What metrics, if any, are being used to capture how the initiative may be
helping the local economy?

5

Overview
Subsequent chapters will seek to answer the research questions through a
literature review, interviews conducted in Djibouti with U.S. government, military, and
contracting officials as well as local Djiboutians. As Africa First expands its reach, the
U.S. must first decipher which African countries can offer suppliers who are eligible, and
second, work to standardize the processes for finding vendors within each country. The
mixed methodology research focuses on the challenges and successes of the short-lived
Djibouti First. The research findings are then used to create a framework which decision
makers can use to help shape future supplier partnerships in Africa.

6

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The following chapter covers an analytical review of literature surrounding the
desired research objectives. Currently, there is a gap in literature in regards to how supply
chain management and procurement can work in conjunction with foreign policy to
further U.S. national objectives and help support local growth. Complicating the review
further, there are even fewer pieces of literature on how to initiate the creation of supply
chains in developing countries with weak economies. The literature review covers
challenges of logistics execution in Africa, considerations when creating supplier
relationships, and what to consider when working in the bottom of the socio-economic
pyramid. Logistics competence, supplier relationships and bottom of the pyramid
execution will help to expose what and how the U.S. should approach supply chain
management in Africa. When investigated and pieced together the overall review should
give a clearer picture as to how success in Djibouti and the Africa First Initiative should
be evaluated.
Bottom of the Pyramid Suppliers
The bottom of the pyramid is a term that scholars use to describe the largest and
poorest socio-economic group. The base of the socio-economic pyramid encompasses
approximately 4 billion people who earn and live on roughly five dollars per day. The
bottom of the pyramid has become a strategic focal point for operational mangers,
corporations, and governments alike (Fawcett & Waller, 2015). Success operating at the
bottom of the pyramid has been elusive due to the challenges of supply and distribution
7

in extremely deprived economies. Sourcing from bottom-of-the-pyramid producers is not
easy either (Karamchandani et al., 2011). Few companies, research shows, have
successfully integrated large numbers of small, disaggregated suppliers into their value
chains (Karamchandani et al., 2011). The vast majority of the research surrounding the
bottom of the pyramid focuses on how to create profits by selling products to its customer
base. Literature examining suppliers from this economic group is incredibly small,
however, there seems to be a growing interest in creating profits by including this group
as suppliers and producers. If Africa First is to achieve success, the research surrounding
bottom of the pyramid must be taken into account as this is where the majority of the
African continent lies.
When micro-entrepreneurs serve as upstream suppliers in a supply chain, the
business opportunity for them is to access a new market or to get better prices for their
output in existing markets; the opportunity for the enterprise is to buy goods more
cheaply that they could otherwise and, at the same time, be seen as contributing toward
poverty alleviation (Sodhi & Tang, 2014). While the idea seems simple in theory there
are a number of challenges that stand in the way of poverty alleviation and accessing new
markets. Culture, infrastructure, and government and business regulations often times are
large obstacles to success.
Operating across borders has always required that companies evaluate how
country culture influences product and process adaptation; operating at the bottom of the
pyramid requires additional analysis (Fawcett & Waller, 2015). Culture and the local way
of life can have an impact on what types of products are needed, as well as what the
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country can produce. In turn, these factors will have an impact on the development of a
prosperous supply chain and should be considered carefully.
Small suppliers rarely have access to high quality inputs (or the credit to buy
them), they often lack training, and their output can be unreliable (Karamchandani et al.,
2011). When sourcing from underdeveloped countries, education and training need to be
an integral part of the supply chain proposal as the resources needed to support
businesses are often missing. The poor often lack relevant information to improve
productivity and to increase selling opportunities (Sodhi & Tang, 2014).
Suppliers within the bottom of the pyramid remain largely untapped due to
numerous economic barriers. Literature surrounding the bottom of the pyramid proposes
several research opportunities to better understand the dynamics of suppliers who are
located at the lowest end of the socio-economic pyramid. Sodhi and Tang, two leading
researchers in this area state that it would be useful to examine different ways for social
enterprises or companies to create supply chain with micro-entrepreneurs who would
otherwise lack market access, market information, and selling opportunities (Sodhi &
Tang, 2014). They go on to say that modeling the value of direct purchase and direct
market access, as well as modeling the value of search cost reduction, would be useful to
see how supply and selling opportunities could be improved at this level (Sodhi & Tang,
2014).
Still others promote the idea of creativeness and inventive thinking in order to
generate opportunities for poor suppliers. Karamchandani. Kubzansjy, and Lalwani of the
Harvard Business Review assert that corporations who chose to do business at the bottom
of the pyramid must have a long-range mindset, be able to work in informal markets, and
9

ensure that their organizational culture will not stifle any bottom of the pyramid
innovation (Karamchandani et al., 2011). Originality and invention in the supply chain
culture is necessary when trying to create business in a poor market. The most
encouraging business-model innovations at the bottom of the pyramid manage to
surmount multiple barriers at the same time; they represent not incremental adaptations
but new, groundbreaking end-to-end strategies (Karamchandani et al., 2011). The
potential for success in countries who lie at the bottom of the pyramid is feasible but
requires patience and a commitment to educating and training suppliers, customers and
producers alike.
Distribution Networks and Logistics Execution in Africa
After AFRICOM was created in 2008, there was an initial hesitation as to what
U.S. interests on the continent would bring for the African people. Djibouti First sought
to show U.S. dedication and long-term commitment to the Djiboutian government and
people. The War on Terror, Africa’s vast natural resources and widespread instability
across the continent are all factors that play a role for the new foreign policy of the
United States (Cruz & Stephens, 2010). The United States must be cognizant of the rising
sentiment of Anti-Americanism in the world, as the efforts in foreign nations will become
increasingly difficult without the support of local populations. Thus, foreign nations are
less likely to value cooperation with the United States, if public unpopularity of the U.S.
is high (Cruz & Stephens, 2010). It would seem the initiative, as it stands now, is
considered to be more of an outreach program than an advantageous supplier program.
Considering Djibouti’s weak economy, it is of great importance the United States places
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emphasis on the proper mix of both smart and hard power. Not only should plans be put
into place to advance military interests, but on increasing the economy, education, and
health of the country to ensure a continuing cooperation between Djibouti and the
interests of USAFRICOM.
As Djibouti First extends and expands its reach under the name of Africa First,
it’s important to note the challenges presented by the continent as a whole when
considering how to create new supplier relationships outside of Djibouti. While Africa
has, and continues to face a number of political and economic difficulties, the entirety of
the continent offers an incredible amount of potential and opportunities for positive
growth. However, challenges present themselves in a number of areas including our main
area of focus, logistical networks. In order to help facilitate efficient material support
across the Horn of Africa, the CJTF-HOA Logistics directorate (CJ4), a tenant unit at
Camp Lemonnier, has tried to establish greater distribution networks to monitor and
control logistics execution (King et al., 2013). Africa is comprised of 54 countries which
each have their own unique cultures and customs. Cultural differences create problems
for moving supplies over such a large region of space.
On top of social and cultural cooperation issues, perhaps the most pressing
challenge is the ‘tyranny of distance’, which is a vast landscape of diverse terrain
spanning more than 1,500 miles (King et al., 2013). The “tyranny of distance” places
demanding tasks on U.S. personnel seeking to move materials and products to their final
destinations. The term “tyranny of distance” was coined due to the challenges faced in a
theater that is far greater in land mass than any other theater the US Armed Forces have
ever operated in (King et al., 2013).
11

Sound infrastructure is an important basis of any supply chain operation. Sturdy
roads, reliable sources of power, and stable construction help information and products
flow with ease. In addition to huge areas of land, African countries, in general, lack
infrastructure and have degraded road conditions that often make traveling very difficult
(King et al., 2013). A seemingly simple transportation route through Africa is often
deceiving, many times proving to be problematic due to an absence of adequate
infrastructure. The ability to move products quickly on trustworthy infrastructure is
extremely important when military operations are involved. Contingency missions may
require supplies and services that are needed on short notice. The closer reliable suppliers
are to the mission, the better chances the U.S. has for operational success. It’s incorrect to
think all reliable suppliers will be short distances away from the mission, therefore U.S.
stakeholders must consider the responsiveness and availability of logistics networks in
Africa. A successful education of suppliers under Africa First will do no good if suppliers
are unable to move their products or services in a timely and cost-efficient manner to
their customer base.
On the surface, Africa First may seem relatively easy to implement, but when the
geographic, economic, and cultural issues of the continent are taken into account it
becomes increasingly complex. U.S. policy makers must be attentive to the challenges
presented when choosing qualified countries as suppliers in Africa First.
Supplier Selection and Monitoring Supplier Performance
Supplier selection is an integral part of the overall supply chain process.
Evaluation criteria and benchmarks can vary widely from product to product and service

12

to service; effectively making supplier selection a somewhat puzzling task. Selection is
made even more difficult when selecting sources of supply in a developing country.
Basically, the term “developing countries” describes nations with a lower stage of
development than industrialized countries in economic, political and sociocultural
respects (Akamp & Muller, 2013). Djibouti is considered a developing country and the
US must be willing to face risks that are not present in the supply chain of those in
developed countries. Firms have to cope with problems caused by ecological, social, and
qualitative gaps between the desired and the provided performance of their surroundings
(Akamp & Muller, 2013). Social and ecological gaps can cause repercussions throughout
the supply chain that the U.S. should take into consideration. Societal problems affecting
a population such as a lack of education, rampant drug use, or corruption can lead to low
quality products and services. The ecological environment must also be taken into
account, a scarcity of natural resources or using resources in excess can create
complications throughout supply chains. To minimize the likelihood of problems and
disruptions, the new Africa First policy should include guidelines and procedures for both
local suppliers and the U.S. to follow. Simple rules provide a way for organizations to
deal with uncertainty and hence are likely a component of how they approach the
inherent uncertainty in supply chain decisions (Wu & Pagell, 2011).
Once suppliers have been chosen, supplier management is key in preserving
quality supplier relationships. The relationship between supplier selection and supplier
management should be explored to maintain a high supply chain resiliency. Which
measures of supplier management are sufficient to safeguard the performance of
suppliers regarding the specific challenges in developing countries with respect to
13

economic, and in particular social, and environmental issues to ultimately satisfy the
buying firm (Akamp & Muller, 2013)? The question posed by Akamp and Muller has no
fast and easy answer. Yet, it is one that must be taken into account by the Department of
Defense when expanding the initiative across country lines.
Supplier selection is often a painstaking process, but the stamina to continually
monitor supplier performance will be key to the success of Africa First. If the U.S. is to
establish a long-term commitment in Africa, the dedication to the education of suppliers
will help to grow the number of reliable providers in the area. It will ensure that certain
products and services will be able to be purchased in the future and may be more cost
efficient in the future.
Current Logistical Conditions in Djibouti
Although Djibouti is still working to develop sturdy infrastructure and a more
diversified economy, their distinguishing feature, as mentioned previously, is its location.
A spot along the Gulf of Aden has made Djibouti a prime location for not only American
military interests but for several of the world’s powers as well. Djibouti has few natural
resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign
assistance to help support its balance of payments and to finance development projects
(Coleman, 2015). China, France, Saudi Arabia and Japan have also claimed real estate in
Djibouti for reasons similar to the U.S.. Djibouti's assets include a strategic geographic
location, an open trade regime, a stable currency, substantial tax breaks and other
incentives (Coleman, 2015). These assets in particular create a sound environment for the
objectives and intents of the Djibouti First policy to hopefully flourish. A lack of natural
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resources means Djibouti’s economy is dominated by the services sector, providing
services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and
refueling center (Coleman, 2015). No surprise then, that the service sector dominates the
Djibouti First Initiative as well.
In order to determine the ability of a country’s logistical environment, the World
Bank maintains a Logistics Performance Report (LPI) comparing 160 countries. The LPI
is an interactive benchmarking tool created to help countries identify the challenges and
opportunities they face in their performance on trade logistics (The Logistics
Performance Index, 2017). The LPI consists therefore of both qualitative and quantitative
measures and helps build profiles of logistics friendly countries (The Logistics
Performance Index, 2017). The LPI is currently the most robust and thorough report
detailing the logistical limitations and strengths of countries, and geographical region.
According to the World Bank’s LPI website, countries are analyzed in the following six
components:


The efficiency of customs and border management clearance



The quality of trade and transport infrastructure



The ease of arranging competitively priced shipments



The competence and quality of logistics services



The ability to track and trace consignments



The frequency with which shipments reach consignees within scheduled or expected
delivery times

The report combines both qualitative and quantitative aspects to acquire a sizeable
amount of data. The LPI uses standard statistical techniques to aggregate the data into a
single indicator that can be used for cross-country comparisons (The Logistics
15

Performance Index, 2017). The single indicator is a number on a scale of one to five, with
one being the lowest rating a country can achieve, and a five the highest. The comparison
of these indicators allows for a simpler assessment of the skills and proficiencies
available in individual countries by industry experts. The simple comparison of the six
key components will no doubt be an advantage to policy makers when deciding which
countries to target next for Africa First.
The country of Djibouti ranks 134th on the list of 160 countries with an average score
of 2.32. Policy makers, not only in the best performing countries, but also in emerging
economies, increasingly see the need to implement coherent and consistent policies to
foster seamless and sustainable supply chin operations as an engine of growth (Arvis et
al., 2016). The Initiative seeks to be part of this ‘engine of growth’ however, the U.S.
must use caution as lower LPI scores often involve greater supply chain risks. Low LPI
scores are not unique to Djibouti but to the majority of the continent. Figure 1 can be
found in the 2016 Logistics Performance Report.
Figure 1 shows the average score by geographical region, Djibouti’s score of 2.32 is
slightly below that of the East Africa Region, however most of the continent has a low
average LPI, no higher than 2.75. Supply chains are complex, but their performance is
largely dependent on country characteristics, especially the soft and hard infrastructure
and institutions that logistics requires to operate well, such as imports, regulations,
procedures, and behaviors (Arvis et al., 2016). The low LPI in both Djibouti and the
geographical region can be explained by the lack of economic strength that covers the
majority of the continent.
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Figure 1: LPI score means (Arvis et al., 2016)

The information gathered by examining the data found within the Logistics
Performance Index will help stakeholders in the Africa First initiative by providing a
picture of what to expect when trying to procure products from a certain region or
country. The overall and component LPI scores illustrate the logistics environment and
the level of capability the identified area has. The ability to distinguish certain strengths
and weaknesses of a region or country’s logistics network will allow initiative stake
holders to better identify probabilities of success.
Conclusion
The purpose of the literature review was to briefly examine the intricate issues
surrounding the development of a supply chain, as well as the complicated task of
developing suppliers in weak economies such as those in Africa. For our purposes, it is
important to focus on the bottom of the pyramid; supplier selection and current logistical
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conditions through performance measures such as the LPI, to better understand how to
advance strategic interests while developing local supply chains. By bringing together the
areas of research mentioned in this chapter, one should be able to address the lack of
organized supply chain information surrounding Africa First. The ability to create a better
framework for Africa First will require an analysis of the lessons learned in Djibouti as
well as taking concepts from the bottom of the pyramid, distribution networks in Africa
and supplier selection to create a lasting impactful program.

18

III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The following chapter describes the methods used to reveal how the initiative is
affecting the supply network at Camp Lemonnier and how it may affect AFRICOM in the
future. The chapter will present the methodology used and the approaches to both data
collection and analysis.
Mixed Methods Approach
In order to best answer the research questions presented in chapter 1, a mixed
methods approach was determined to be the best fit for this particular study. Both
qualitative and quantitative measures will be used in the analysis to better clarify the
uncertainty surrounding the research questions. Typically, findings inductively derived
from the data in a qualitative study are in the form of themes, categories, typologies,
concepts, tentative hypotheses and even theory about a particular aspect of practice
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Qualitative researchers typically gather multiple forms of
data, such as interviews, observations, documents, and audiovisual information rather
than a single source (Creswell, 2014). The qualitative portion of the mixed method design
will be collected in the form of semi structured interviews whereas the quantitative
portion will be data collected through the 2017 Logistics Performance Index and the 2017
Doing Business Report.
The qualitative portion, the semi-structured interviews, will be analyzed, coded
and then compared to the data gathered from the Logistics Performance Index and Doing
Business Report. The key assumption of this approach is that both qualitative and
19

quantitative data provide different types of information-often detailed views of
participants qualitatively and scores on instruments quantitatively-and together they yield
results that should be the same (Creswell, 2014). The results from each of the qualitative
and quantitative portions will then be reviewed through merging both sections of the data.
Merging the data involves combining the quantitative and qualitative data through the
procedures of a side-by-side comparison, data transformation or a joint display (Creswell,
2014). A side-by-side comparison of the findings from Africa First will allow for the
analysis of the qualitative data to build into the following data sets of quantitative figures.
The comparison of qualitative and quantitative measures allows for a more thorough
explanation of Africa First, and the research will be enhanced by using various data sets.
Semi-Structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with willing participants who had
knowledge of or worked directly with the Africa First program. A semi-structured
interview was used with participants to create a discussion-based environment in order to
elicit the most information possible. Semi-structured interviews allow for the researcher
to determine the format and timeline of the questions being asked. Typically, the semi structured format allows for more flexibility and the opportunity to formulate additional
questions throughout the discussion. The questions asked of the respondents are the basis
of the findings and through a series of steps constitute the input for the conclusions of the
research (Kumar, 2011). The interview format included several focused and open-ended
questions. The open-ended questions can provide a wealth of information provided the
respondents feel comfortable about expressing their opinions (Kumar, 2011). Due to the

20

wide variety of participants involved in the study, the semi-structured format allowed for
a wider scope of answers and information than a structured interview or a questionnaire
would have provided.
Data Collection
The data collection for the interview process began with participants from the
Department of Defense J4. The J4 offices had a hand in implementing the Djibouti First
Initiative as well as educating U.S. stakeholders. The J4 office gave the researcher a list
of members from several offices that had worked with the Djibouti First Initiative and
would be willing to provide further insight. The researcher also contacted the U.S.
Department of State to interview State Department members who were involved with the
local procurement process in Djibouti. After using references and contacts of both
offices, the researcher was able to conduct 13 interviews. Each interview participant was
placed into one of three stakeholder groups.

Table 1: Stakeholder Groups
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The first group, Policy Creation and Procedure, is comprised of participants that
have a hand in establishing or designing the Africa First Policy. The group encompassed
participants from J4, military legal offices, and U.S. State Department participants. The
second group included participants who had involvement in the Afghanistan First
Initiative or Central Asian States procurement policy. The third group included
participants who were involved in the Djibouti First policy execution. Participants in this
group worked directly with the local organizations and vendors.
The majority of the data collection for the study took place at Camp Lemonnier in
the form of sit down semi-structured interviews. The remaining interviews were
conducted in the same semi structured format over the phone. Each participant was given
details, objectives, and their rights as a respondent of the research prior to the interviews
taking place. Participants were given a similar set of questions however, questions may
have slightly varied due to position or experience. The interview was structured as three
sections: positioning questions, strategic questions and open questions. The interviews
were recorded and then transcribed by the researcher. If interviewees opted not to have
their interviews recorded, attentive notes were taken and then transcribed based upon the
notes.
Data Analysis
After each interview was fully transcribed, the interview transcripts were loaded
into the qualitative analyzation software Dedoose. Through the use of the software each
interview was thoroughly coded. A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or
short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or
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evocative attribute for a portion of language based or visual data (Saldana, 2016). In
qualitative research the responses are examined, common themes are identified, the
themes are named (or categories are developed) and the responses given by respondents
are classified under these themes (Kumar, 2011). After reviewing the interview
transcripts, the researcher began with a list of preset codes. The preset codes where
derived from the literature review as well as the research and investigative questions. If
there were any emergent codes that appeared through the coding process, the researcher
would recode each interview with the same code list to ensure continuity throughout the
coding process. Through the coding process each interview was examined and significant
quotes were categorized and grouped. Coding enables one to organize and group
similarly coded data into categories or “families” because they share some characteristicthe beginning of a pattern (Saldana, 2016). The Dedoose software allows the researcher
to examine the data, identify portions which include content meaningful to their research
focus and research questions, block these portions, and then apply any number of
appropriate codes or tags (Dedoose, 2018). The program then allows the researcher to
view a number of different visualization tools to help identify larger themes or patterns
located within the interview data.
Following the coding process, data and statistics from the Logistics Performance
Index and the Doing Business Report were analyzed to determine if the codes and themes
identified from the interviews paralleled the quantitative data available from these
reports.

23

Logistics Performance Report
The data for the quantitative part of the analysis was taken from the 2016
Logistics Performance Index as well as the 2017 Doing Business Report. Now in its fifth
edition, the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) embodies the experience of logistics
professionals worldwide and tries to capture the complexity of supply chains in synthetic
indicators that are comparable across countries (Arvis et al., 2016). The LPI uses six
components to evaluate a country’s logistical performance.
The six components and their definitions as listed in the 2016 Logistics Performance
Report are:


Customs: the efficiency of customs and border management clearance



Infrastructure: the quality of both trade and transport infrastructure



Logistics Competence: the quality and ability of logistics services



Timeliness: ease of arranging competitively priced shipments



International Shipments: the frequency with which shipments reach consignees within
scheduled or expected delivery time



Tracking and Tracing: ability to track and trace consignments

The LPI uses standard statistical techniques to aggregate data into a single indicator
for each component as well as an overall LPI score (Arvis et al., 2016). The overall LPI
and component scores for several countries in the African continent were extracted to be
analyzed for this research. The LPI has provided valuable information for policy makers,
traders, and other stakeholders, including researchers and academics on the role logistics
for growth and the policies needed to support logistics in areas such as infrastructure
planning, service provision, and cross border trade and transport facilitation (Arvis, et al.,
2016).
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Doing Business Report
The Doing Business report measures aspects of regulation that enable or prevent
private sector businesses from starting, operating and expanding (World Bank, 2017).
The Doing Business Report presents results for two aggregate measures: the distance to
frontier score and the ease of doing business ranking, which is based on the distance to
frontier score (World Bank, 2017). Each score will help determine the logistics and
business environment within the specified country. The ease of doing business ranking
compares economies with one another; the distance to frontier score benchmarks
economies with respect to regulatory best practice, showing the absolute distance to the
best performance on each doing business indicator (World Bank, 2017). The report ranks
190 countries with an overall “Ease of Doing Business Ranking” and subsequent
indicator sets. For example, a rank of ‘1’ on ‘Ease of doing business” would indicate a
country as the world leader whereas a country with a score of 190 would indicate the
lowest possible ranking. The aspects of regulation found in the report are measured using
11 indicator sets, 4 of these indicator sets were used in the analysis portion; starting a
business, getting electricity, getting credit and trading across borders. The data taken
from the four indicator sets included each indicator sets ranking and its distance to
frontier score.
Conclusion
The methodology used for the research surrounding the Africa First Initiative
included both qualitative and quantitative methods, leading to a mixed methods design.
The convergent parallel mixed method design provided the best structure for evaluating

25

semi structured interviews as well as examining data collected from the Logistics
Performance Index and Doing Business Report.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Introduction
The following chapter analyzes the findings from the Logistics Performance
Index, components from the Doing Business Report and the major themes that emerged
from the coded interviews. The quantitative data from the reports and the qualitative data
obtained from the interviews are interconnected and can be used to create a framework
that will help decision makers better understand the capabilities of the countries being
considered for the expansion of Africa First.
Logistics Performance Index
Figure 2 highlights Djibouti’s overall LPI rank, overall LPI score, and the
corresponding component scores.

Figure 2: 2016 Djibouti LPI (Arvis et al., 2016)
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As the Word Bank ranks 160 countries for the LPI, Djibouti’s position at 134th
certainly has room for improvement. Djibouti’s scores are also compared to the overall
LPI and component scores for the region, as well as the similar income groups.
Comparatively, Djibouti performs slightly worse than countries within their
region, Middle East & North Africa, as well as their income group, lower middle income.
The radar chart indicates there is not a single component that rises above a score of 3 for
Djibouti. While the similar region and income groups fair slightly better, it is significant
to note that Djibouti lags slightly behind both groups in overall performance levels. The
component scores indicate that completing any type of logistics or supply chain related
task may be hampered by any one of the component scores.
Logistics Performance Index Country Comparison
There are roughly 6,000 servicemen and women stationed in 50 of 54 countries on
the African continent, with approximately 4,000 residing at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier
(Neuhaus, 2017). With a presence throughout the majority of the continent, decision
makers will need to determine the locations with the most potential for success with the
expansion of Africa First. Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
Somalia and Uganda are a sampling of the countries where there is an American military
presence. The countries listed for comparison where chosen for a variety of reasons.
Algeria is one of the U.S.’ top trade partners on the continent, while Nigeria boasts
Africa’s largest economy and Ethiopia is one of the world’s fastest growing economies.
The United States has strategic interests in the stability and prosperity of both Cameroon
and Libya. Finally, the U.S. has recently conducted military operations in Mali, Niger,
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and Somalia. The countries offer diversity in a number of areas and will offer a wide
range of logistics competencies for the Africa First Initiative.
Figure 3: LPI country comparison depicts each country’s LPI score and
component score. We see that all 10 countries’ overall LPI scores and component scores
are rather low. Uganda, Nigeria, and Algeria are the best performers of the group
outpacing the others with slightly higher overall and component scores.

Figure 3: LPI Country Comparison (Arvis et al., 2016)

Doing Business Report
The Doing Business Report rates economies on how business friendly their
regulatory systems are using the distance to frontier score and the ease of doing business
ranking (World Bank, 2017). The same 10 countries analyzed in the LPI portion are listed
in Table 2; the top number indicates the country’s ranking in each component. A rank of
1 is the very best number a country can receive while 190 is the worst.
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Selecting Doing Business Categories
The four most important scores selected with regards to the expansion of the
Africa First policy are starting a business, getting electricity, getting credit, and trading
across borders. The ability to operate and expand is dependent upon the regulations that
must be complete in order to start a business. If Africa First aims to push money into
weak economies by creating employment opportunities, businesses must be able to start,
develop and increase in size. Getting electricity indicators measure the reliability of
electricity supply. Africa has widespread infrastructure problems and the ability to
receive and maintain reliable sources of energy allows connectivity to produce, move,
and receive products and information from a supply network. The ability to get credit is
incredibly important for businesses and startups alike. It enables a business to acquire
funding for its numerous operations. Finally, trading across borders is an important factor
that must be taken into consideration when expanding Africa First. Due to the vast nature
of military and state department operations, materials and products will need to be moved
across borders. Regulations or protocols complicating these movements will affect the
efficiency and effectiveness of any supply network seeking to import or export.
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Table 2: Doing Business Country Comparison (World Bank, 2017)

Djibouti’s is ranked very low on their overall score and subsequent component
scores. The scores indicate there are likely to be issues with opening a business, the
infrastructure, and moving products through customs. Analyzing the remaining nine
countries, we see the same is true of the Doing Business reports and the LPI scores,
Djibouti as well as the other countries selected, consistently fall in the bottom quarter of
the overall rankings when it comes to logistics and business performance. The scores
signify the success of Africa First will not be successful if our purchases are simply
transactional with the local organizations. By comparing and contrasting the two reports
it is evident that logistics and business operations in this region of the world are going to
face considerable challenges. For a successful initiative our dealings with the local
organizations must become more of a partnership in order to overcome the difficulties
shown in these reports.
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Semi-Structured Interviews
After coding the interviews, there were three major themes that emerged: logistics
competence and infrastructure, contextual importance, and initiation of Africa First and
risk mitigation. These themes were mentioned the highest number of times by the 13
participants throughout the course of the interviews. Logistics competence and
infrastructure relates to anything involving the ability and ease of logistics services
available such as, unreliable vendors, order accuracy, contrasting business standards or
transportation. Contextual importance relates to anything involving U.S. or Djiboutian
government regulations, local customs and culture, or corruption and bribery. The final
theme, initiation of Africa First and risk mitigation encompasses all suggestions the
participants had for furthering local procurement initiatives as well as the risks posed by
sourcing locally. Table 3 shows the overarching conclusion presented by each group for
each corresponding theme.
Table 3: Stakeholder Group Theme Conclusion
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Once again, the Policy Creation and Procedure Group had a hand in designing and
implementing the policy. The participants in the second group participated in the
Afghanistan First/CAS initiative. Finally, the Policy Execution group worked directly
with the Djiboutian companies or with the U.S. government as a local vendor. The
following sections describe each group’s thoughts on the three major themes in greater
detail.
Logistics Competence and Infrastructure
Group 1: Policy Creation and Procedure
The Policy Creation and Procedure Group indicated while there are certainly
issues with logistics competence and infrastructure, the larger idea was to use the
initiative as a platform for continued engagement. A participant from J4 stated that:

“Really the program is a springboard for engagement and outreach…work on
education, teach them how to write a successful bid, and use it as a
communication platform for some of the larger contractors, explain what our
upcoming needs are and help them to be competitive.” (J4 Participant)

Overall, the group focused more on the overarching goals of the program as
opposed to specific incidences with logistics competence and infrastructure. The group
collectively acknowledged that a lower level of logistics competence was to be expected
and the purpose of the initiative is to help Djibouti and other African countries improve
their knowledge and familiarity with logistics operations.
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Group 2: Afghanistan First/CAS initiative
Group 2 highlighted a number of different issues concerning logistics competence
and infrastructure. The participants who worked with Afghanistan First stated many of
the local companies did not know how to approach western standards of logistics and
lacked the experience and education to do so. A GSA participant stated:

“And they have several programs but their basic package to me, is quite
interesting, and I think quite useful, especially in a place like this, where there are
companies who approach Western technical standards, Western quality, but need
a little bit of help to kind of get over that line and with that help I think there’s a
bunch of companies over there that can break through and begin to supply
multinationals and conglomerates in Europe other parts of Asia the oil industries,
etc with just a little more help.” (GSA Participant)

Another participant from GSA who worked with a local company to purchase
mattresses for military members discussed the importance of outside agencies helping the
local companies improve their logistics competency:

“We knew that it was going to take a little bit of work to get them up to speed, to
get them up to the quality of what we could actually start buying. So, that’s
actually where the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
did the most work with them. They brought in supply chain experts, and
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manufacturing experts to Lina, helped them, loaned them money to bring in the
process experts to actually streamline their manufacturing process first.” (GSA
Participant)
The issue of logistics competence mentioned by each of the participants
throughout the course of the interviews was the dramatic difference in quality and
business standards as compared to U.S. standards. A TWI participant spoke of the quality
inconsistencies as one of the problems when working with a local company.

“One was kind of the spec problem. Another was quality problems, you know, I
mean they don’t produce things, typically, to the same quality specs that the U.S.
customers are used to.” (Third Party Logistics Contractor)

Largely, Group 2 focused on the complications of working with companies who
cannot produce or do not have the knowledge to produce products or services that are up
to U.S. standards.
Group 3: Policy Execution
The group that most closely worked with the local companies again emphasized
the difficulty in finding companies who were dependable and able to meet the industry
standards necessary for continued business. Noble is a logistics company that works
closely with DLA at Camp Lemonnier. One of the Noble participants explained the
difficulty of finding dependable companies:
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“I’m always looking for products locally that will help cut delivery times, but it is
always so difficult to find reliable vendors. I keep a running list of vendors that
are unreliable, my list of reliable vendors…is about 2 companies long.” (Third
Party Logistics Provider)

Another participant from DLA stressed the importance of infrastructure in the
ability to move shipments in a timely and reliable manner:

“I’ve been here for almost 6 months and not once have we done any ground
movements or shipments. The roads and infrastructure here are horrendous.”
(DLA participant)

The policy execution group focused on the infrastructure of the country much
more heavily than the other two groups. They discussed the difficulty of the ground
shipments, U.S. construction codes and permits, as well as the challenges of obtaining
U.S. standard certified materials in the region.
Conclusion
It’s interesting to note the differences between the Policy Implementation and
Policy Execution groups. Policy Implementation acknowledges the lack of logistics
competence in Djibouti but states the initiative is more of a springboard for engagement
while the Policy Execution group heavily discussed the challenges of working in such an
environment. While the focus of the initiative may be outreach and engagement, it is
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important to remember the impact a lack of logistics competence can have on the
operational mission.
Contextual Importance
Group 1: Policy Creation and Procedure
Group 1 spoke often of the many issues holding contextual importance that one
should consider when working with the Djiboutians. A wide array of issues were
highlighted including the culture and local customs, government corruption, and the
government’s policies and citizenship processes.
A participant working for a legal office discussed the challenges presented by working in
the country of Djibouti when trying to secure contracts:

“Most of the population is illiterate and there are struggles with teaching them
these processes. We have seen those who are more educated and can read, take
advantage of those who can’t read.” (General Counsel Participant)

Another official mentioned that one of the challenges being faced right now is the
citizenship process in Djibouti. The path to becoming a Djiboutian is quite liberal. The
official says:

“An interesting issue with the policy is that Djibouti has a very liberal citizenship
process. They’re have been complaints from the Djiboutian government saying
we’re giving business to citizens who are “too new” and they’re not “real
Djiboutians.” (Pentagon Participant)
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The citizenship process has caused some strife between U.S. government officials
and Djiboutian government officials as to which businesses should qualify for the
Djibouti First, now Africa First policy. Due to the lack of stringent citizenship regulations
as well as ambiguous direction in the policy have allowed businesses from Djibouti as
well as surrounding countries to find loopholes in the policy, giving them unfair
advantages to win contracts from the program. They are hoping to find solutions to these
problems before the same issues occur in the initiation of Africa First.
Largely the Policy Creation group recognized a large number of contextual issues
which are presenting challenges. They acknowledged that many of the contextual issues
faced in Djibouti such as government policies, culture and customs, and lack of natural
resources will likely be concerns in other African countries as well.
Group 2: Afghanistan First/CAS initiative:
Group 2 only mentioned issues surrounding contextual importance a few times
however, participants did mention the importance of considering local customs and
culture when trying to implement a policy such as Afghanistan First or Africa First.

“In order to do business with people, and this seems fairly universal between west
and east Africa, you know, the whole sub-Saharan area, you have to build a
relationship with people before you can do business. And you have to be very
careful in engaging, because you don’t want to give them false or inflated
expectations.” (DLA Participant)
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Group 2 reiterated the importance of understanding the local customs in order to
create more successful business and strategic relationships. These working relationships
are critical to establish lines of communication regarding the improvement of local
products and strategy.
Group 3: Policy Execution
Group 3 identified a wider range of issues falling under the category of contextual
importance. The group mentioned the troubles cause by a corrupt government, customs
clearances, and the challenges presented by both U.S. and Djiboutian government
policies. A participant from a Djiboutian construction company that has been awarded
several contracts under Djibouti First, discussed the struggles of U.S. requirements and
the problems caused by Djiboutian Customs:

“The US requires certified material, they are difficult to find. Company will need
to import them but Djibouti customs is notoriously slow, they are always a
problem. Import costs more money and more taxes for the projects, must think
about both indirect and direct costs as well as the timing of the project.” (Local
Construction Company Participant)

A participant from Noble, a logistics company that works closely with DLA at
Camp Lemonnier, acknowledged local companies don’t always get a fair chance at
contract eligibility. The participant recognized there have been problems of corruption
and exploitation throughout the course of Djibouti First:
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“For example, on the vendor days put on by the embassy, the local chamber of
commerce will invite their “friends”, the government is a bit corrupt so you have
to be careful with who you are dealing with.” (Third Party Logistics Provider)

The Policy Execution group discussed a range of contextual topics that presented
issues for the Djibouti First Initiative. The main take away from this group was that
contextual issues such as government regulations and cultural differences have played a
substantial role in the interactions of U.S. officials and local vendors.
Conclusion
Each group was very similar in their response to the importance of contextual
issues when working outside of the continental U.S.. They all agreed customs and
government regulations can greatly affect the success of the initiative and the U.S. must
be intimately aware of these issues in order to help facilitate businesses and logistics
services for operational missions.
Africa First Initiation and Risk Mitigation
Group 1: Policy Creation and Procedure
Participants in Group 1 spent a significant amount of time discussing the changes
needed for the implementation of Africa First. They discussed the need for better
communication strategies between all stakeholders. A state department official reports:

“We need to come up with a more centralized communication strategy. What are
the main talking points and goals of this program? Every post cannot create their
own talking points for a policy that is centralized, all of the embassies need to be
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on the same page and right now we are not. There needs to be a more welldefined implementation guide. Right now, it’s difficult because it is too vague,
because companies are able to find legal loopholes; but you can’t make it too
rigid either.” (U.S. Department of State Participant)

Another state department official agrees the lack of a defined implementation
guide adds difficulty when seeking eligible companies:

“I worked with the former economic officer to implement the policy, it was very
difficult because the law didn’t express how to vet or select the eligible
companies, we had to come up with that on our own.” (U.S. Department of State
Participant)

Group 1 also discussed the need for improved metrics, or how they should
evaluate the measure of success the initiative is having.

“We look to measure the utilization, sort of the number of actions, and not
necessarily the contracts. We would then want to see how these contracts are used
and to what extent. But, we need to make sure it’s not a burden on their very weak
economy. Have to try not to make the initiative too unattractive or overly
burdensome on the locals.” (J4 participant)
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In general, the sentiment surrounding the initiation of Africa First involved an
improvement in communication. Improved communication is needed to ensure
stakeholders are aware of the initiative and what it is the initiative is trying to accomplish.
Furthermore, it will enable embassy’s and future policy makers to develop the initiative
by ensuring proper communication strategies between all stakeholder groups.
Group 2: Afghanistan First/ CAS Initiative
The Afghanistan First group stressed the importance of these initiatives when it
comes to building strategic relationships between militaries and countries:

“You know, the focus on central Asian sourcing diminished, you know, as well.
And so, it kind of fizzled away, that problem. But I can see that becoming an issue
again in the future because, you know, the local sourcing, and developing local
sources, is a tool in any combatant commander’s toolbox. You know, and it’s a
pretty powerful one.” (Third Party Logistics Provider)

The Afghanistan First/CAS initiative group had little to say about improvements
that could be made for similar initiatives in the future. Instead, they focused on how these
initiatives can help propel companies into new markets. With the right amount of
education and patience, companies are able to improve their products by enhancing their
production lines and business understanding.
Group 3: Policy Execution
Participants in the Policy Execution Group also focused on the need for better
communication between stakeholder groups. All of the participants expressed frustrations
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at the lack of information and interactions between stakeholder groups. A contracting
participant deployed to Camp Lemonnier reported their office never received any
information regarding the initiative. They only learned of the initiative after a request was
sent requiring the latest number of Djibouti First actions.

“Right now, it’s just a challenge for the contracting office. The policy needs to be
easier to read and to understand. I didn’t hear anything about it when I first
arrived, then I was told I needed to send reports, now the policy has shifted to
Africa First and we’re still in the dark as to what is required of us.” (Contracting
Participant)

A participant from a local construction company also explained the lack of
education for local companies prevents them from becoming eligible. The participant
noted the program:

“Would be better if the U.S. embassy could better teach companies what needs to
be done, there needs to be someone there to support companies through the
process if the program is going to expand due to challenging process of working
with the U.S. government.” (Local Construction Company)

Some participants mentioned the challenges of local procurement initiatives when
working in a contingency environment:
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“Often times in a contingency environment we need things now. And it’s
frustrating when pushes to buy locally can slow the process down by even a
week.” (Contracting Participant)

The Policy Execution Group reiterated the need for an education plan that
includes all stakeholders. Local companies suggested the embassy have workshops or
appoint a dedicated employee to help the locals understand the needs of the U.S.
government as well as how to compete for bids. Contractors and other military members
also proposed some sort of training to help incoming members learn the objectives of the
initiative.
Conclusion
The need for a more formal education and training plan was central to each group.
In order to prepare for the upcoming expansion of the initiative, each stakeholder group
must thoroughly understand the objectives and goals of the initiative. This holds true for
both U.S. stakeholders and local vendors. As Camp Lemonnier is a deployed
environment, the turnover of personnel is quite high, occurring every 6-9 months.
Incoming and outgoing members should ensure turnover of information in order to
continue our local procurement efforts. Local vendors also need education on how to
approach U.S. contracting. The Department of Defense contracting process can be quite
lengthy and tedious. A local training or education system would be beneficial in allowing
more vendors to understand the process and offer them a chance to win bids. Education
and training would give each stakeholder group the knowledge to further develop the
program into something that is more productive.
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Conclusion
After examining the challenges and successes of Djibouti First through both
quantitative and qualitative data, there is a clear need for enhanced communication,
education, and awareness among each stakeholder group. Although there were not
specific incidences of local suppliers or their products hindering operations mentioned,
the interviewees discussed the challenges presented by the local initiative. Items did not
have the specified quality, orders have been stuck in customs, reorders were not
uncommon due to inaccurate shipments and untimeliness of locally procured products
have caused delays. It was found that purchasing locally and the continued presence of
the U.S. military has created employment opportunities but specifics on how the U.S. or
the Djibouti First Initiative has affected the economy cannot yet be determined due to a
lack of data. Due to the multiple challenges presented by purchasing in Djibouti, the
Africa First Initiative does not yet present a cost-effective option for the U.S. In the
future, it will be important to further define a set of metrics that measure success for the
initiative.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
The overarching objective of the research was to determine how purchasing
locally procured products contribute to the supply network at Camp Lemonnier, and how
to use this information to better inform future logistical decisions for Africa First. How
will the information acquired from the research be useful moving forward? The Logistics
Performance Index, Doing Business Report, and qualitative data obtained from
interviews provide enough information to establish a basic framework for decision
makers looking to expand into new countries. By using country and interview data, the
framework will allow leaders to compare countries by identifying the factors most
important for success. First, decision makers must look at where the U.S. is operating
within the continent. What areas or operational missions would benefit from a local
procurement initiative? Second, U.S. decision makers must examine how they are
looking to operate. For example, are they looking to grow a company that is already in
business? Are they focusing on the procurement of a specific product? The U.S. must
understand their objectives and use the information from the reports to benefit both U.S.
and local stakeholders. Finally, once we have decided on a particular region or country
we should look at the Logistics Performance Index or the Doing Business Report to see
how they are performing in terms of business and logistics ability. Are there any trends?
Have the countries made any reforms or regulations in the past few years to hinder or
improve business or supply chains?
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Methodological Contribution
Assuming all permissions and international agreements are in place, let’s suppose
decision makers for Africa First have narrowed the list of possible countries under
consideration down to three; Algeria, Uganda, and Nigeria. These three countries will
answer the first question, where are we looking to operate? While these countries are
hypothetical they do offer some interesting advantages. According to the U.S.
Department of State the United States and Algeria have “signed a trade and investment
framework agreement, establishing common principles on which the economic
relationship is founded and forming a platform for negotiating other bilateral agreements”
(U.S. Department of State, 2017). Nigeria is the largest economy and most populous
country in Africa with an estimated population of more than 180 million and an estimated
gross domestic product of 510 billion USD in 2013 (U.S. Department of State, 2017).
Uganda has been a reliable partner with the U.S. in promoting stability in the Horn and
East/Central Africa and combatting terror (U.S. Department of State, 2017) Let’s assume
our objectives for these areas are similar to the objectives in Djibouti, the U.S. is looking
to promote growth in their economies by capitalizing on local resources and cultivating
labor.
In order to decide which is the best option, we will begin with the data from the
logistics performance index comparing their component scores. In Djibouti, the most
relevant scores from the logistics performance index were the logistics competence and
infrastructure component scores. Both of these components are highlighted in green on
Figure 4. Comparing the three countries, it seems all three countries have very similar
logistics competence and infrastructure scores, while Uganda outperforms Algeria and
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Nigeria on the other four component scores. Given the fact that the three countries have
similar scores in our areas of focus, we will now further dissect the logistics performance
index scores.

Figure 4: LPI Comparison of Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda (Arvis et al., 2016)

The data from the logistics performance index table shows Uganda’s LPI
component scores are consistently the highest.
Table 4: LPI Framework Comparison (Arvis et al., 2016)

Choosing a country off of LPI data alone suggests that Uganda would be the best
choice. However, let’s look at the data in table 5 from the Doing Business Report.
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Table 5: Doing Business Framework Comparison (World Bank, 2017)

9

Uganda shows the best overall ease of doing business ranking but trails Algeria
and Nigeria in the starting a business ranking, and trails Algeria in the ability to get
electricity. Uganda also has made reform in staring a business and trading across borders
which indicates an improvement in performance. Depending upon the goals or specific
objectives the decision makers foresee it may be important to further analyze the ability
to start a business or get electricity. We know from the interviews in Djibouti that
regulations and policies surrounding startups have caused some issues. We also know the
lack of sufficient infrastructure in Djibouti has affected shipping times and the
availability of products. Getting electricity would be considered part of a country’s
infrastructure network, however, looking back at the LPI scores, we see that Uganda
scores higher in infrastructure than both Algeria and Nigeria. Therefore, of the three
countries selected, Uganda has the ability to perform at the highest level.
The data collected from these reports combined with the information learned from
our experiences in Djibouti provide a good deal of information to be used when selecting
the next countries to introduce to Africa First. A simple framework allows decision
makers to compare and contrast a number of different logistics factors that they can tailor
to their specific objectives. The ability to consider various component scores and linking
the associated scores to our objectives will allow decision makers to focus our attention
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on certain areas and determine how they can improve local procurement. The reports
capture the complexity of supply chains and doing business and present them in a way
that is comparable across countries (Arvis, et al., 2016).
Future Research Opportunities
In order to make future local procurement initiatives prosperous, there are a
number of topics to be researched that would increase our knowledge of how to make the
Africa First Initiative succeed. The data from Djibouti First is very limited and not
centralized. Research should be conducted to further examine the supplier relationships in
Djibouti. What types of products are we buying? How much are we buying and when do
we purchase? Determining how to establish long term relationships with the suppliers in
Djibouti will allow the U.S. to create education and training programs for our
stakeholders in other countries. No information was given throughout the course of the
research as to where the U.S. is looking to expand next. Identifying which regions or
countries are areas of interest would allow for an in depth analysis of the quality and
ability to create logistics networks. This information would allow the U.S. to leverage our
efforts with the logistics or doing business components of focus. We could then better
focus our efforts to identify specific opportunities or challenges within the country of
choice.
Conclusion
In order for Africa First to outperform the Djibouti First Initiative, the U.S. must
better manage the implementation in new regions and provide improved educational
resources for both U.S. stakeholders and local vendors. The Djiboutian economy benefits
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from the mere presence of a permanent U.S. military base, if we are to hoping to build
their economy through an initiative like Africa First, we must create reliable suppliers
who provide dependable products routinely. It is certainly a long-term commitment but
will help the Djiboutians and other countries to create new business by selling to new
markets as well as to the U.S. for military operations. U.S. decision makers must provide
education for U.S. members on the objectives and goals of the initiative. They must also
be willing to supply the locals with training on how to approach Western standards of
business. Local vendors must understand the U.S. contracting process in order for them to
win bids and work under the Africa First Initiative.
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Appendix: Map of Africa
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